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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2803
___________
CURTIS ALLEN YOUNG, 
                     Appellant
v.
MR. JOHN YOST, FCI - Loretto
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 08-cv-00050)
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 27, 2009
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Curtis Allen Young, a federal inmate, appeals from an order denying his habeas
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm.
In 2002, a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
2Virginia convicted Young of uttering counterfeit securities; falsely making a counterfeit
security; possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (“Count 5”
of the Indictment); and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction.  The trial court
imposed a sentence of, inter alia, 60 months on Count 5, to be served consecutively to 145
months in prison for the other convictions.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review.
In 2004, Young filed a motion in the trial court to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
improper use of perjured testimony, insufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing error. 
The trial court denied relief on the merits, and the Fourth Circuit denied Young’s
application for a certificate of appealability. 
After additional unsuccessful post-conviction filings in the trial court, Young filed
an application in December 2007 with the Fourth Circuit seeking permission under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255 to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.  Young claimed
that, based on his recent receipt of a copy of the trial court’s jury instructions, he is
entitled to § 2255 relief because the trial court constructively amended Count 5 through
its instructions, and counsel was ineffective in failing to object to those instructions.  On
January 15, 2008, the Fourth Circuit denied Young leave to file the proposed second or
successive § 2255 motion.
3Young then commenced this habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, his district of
confinement.  He argued that he should be permitted to proceed with his claim that the
trial court improperly amended the indictment through its jury instructions because
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his conviction on Count 5. 
After the government filed a response in opposition, the Magistrate Judge concluded that
Young cannot show that his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective, and
rejected Young’s argument that his claim falls within the narrow exception for seeking
§ 2241 relief recognized in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).  The District
Court overruled Young’s objections and agreed with the Magistrate Judge that Young
failed to meet the test for proceeding under § 2241 rather than § 2255.  Young timely
filed this appeal.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s legal conclusions, and we apply a clearly erroneous standard
to the court’s factual findings.  Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).
Young’s argument for relief turns on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the
provision under which he was charged in Count 5.  Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides in
relevant part that “any person who, during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking
crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years[.]”
      Young has not submitted a copy of the trial transcript in support his claim.  He relies1
instead upon a copy of a written jury instruction, which the trial court purportedly used to
instruct the jury on § 924(c)(1)(A) as follows:  “‘Whoever, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . ., uses or carries a firearm, . . . in
furtherance of any such crime, . . . shall, . . . ’ be guilty of an offense against the United
States.”  Young also cites a separate instruction that the trial court purportedly gave
defining the phrase “carries or possesses a firearm.” 
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Count 5 of the indictment charged Young with “possess[ing] a firearm . . . in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime.”  Young argues that the trial court constructively amended the
indictment language by giving instructions that purportedly allowed the jury to convict
him based on conduct other than possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, such as “using or carrying” a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, or
possessing a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime.  Appellant’s Br.
at 1.   Thus, Young argues, he either was convicted of an offense not charged in the1
indictment, or convicted of an offense that does not exist under § 924(c)(1)(A).
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Young
cannot proceed with his claim under § 2241.  A § 2255 motion is “the presumptive means
by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly
in violation of the Constitution.”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2002).  A prisoner can raise such a challenge via § 2241 only upon showing that § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”  § 2255(e).  Section 2255
is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
denied Young permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion raising his present
5claim.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.  Indeed, the safety valve provided under
§ 2255 is quite narrow, see id., and it clearly does not apply here.
In In re Dorsainvil, the petitioner argued that his conduct was made noncriminal in
light of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), and given his inability to proceed
under § 2255, we held that he could use § 2241 to challenge his conviction for a crime
that an intervening change in the substantive law may have negated.  119 F.3d at 251. 
Young, in contrast, does not rely on an intervening change in the law to argue that his
conduct is noncriminal under § 924(c)(1)(A).  In addition, unlike the petitioner who “had
no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction,” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251,
Young merely asserts that he failed to raise his claim in prior proceedings because he was
unable to obtain a copy of the jury instructions.  We agree with the Magistrate Judge that
Young has not established that he acted diligently to obtain the jury instructions or trial
transcripts, or that he could not have obtained this allegedly “unavailable” material in
time to raise his claims on direct appeal, or in his first § 2255 proceeding.  See Report &
Rec. at 21-22.  Thus, Young cannot viably contend that he lacked an earlier opportunity to
challenge his conviction on the ground now asserted.
Furthermore, as the District Court observed, Young has no viable claim that he
may now be innocent of the crime for which he was charged and convicted – possessing a
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.  Young does not deny ownership of the
weapons at issue, and clearly he possessed those weapons in furtherance of trafficking, as
      See United States v. Young, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2460, 58 Fed. Appx. 980, 9832
(4th Cir. Feb. 11, 2003) (“We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find that
Young had knowledge of and access to the firearms and possessed the firearms to further
his drug activity.  Along with the statement he made to police regarding the location of
the firearms, Young also acknowledged possession of the firearms when he appeared at
his bond hearing and told the magistrate judge that ‘the guns are mine.’  Furthermore, the
weapons recovered were a fully loaded handgun and a fully loaded rifle that were found
in the same residence as the cocaine.  The handgun was located on top of a headboard,
and the rifle was under a bed, making them readily accessible.  Also, as a convicted felon,
Young’s possession of the weapons was illegal.  Based on the evidence, a jury could
reasonably conclude that a connection existed between Young’s possession of the
firearms and his drug trafficking activity.”).
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expressly found by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals when it rejected Young’s
challenge on direct appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction on
Count 5.   Moreover, the “Special Verdict Form” used at trial establishes that the jury2
found Young guilty in Count 5 of “Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug
Trafficking Crime” – precisely the crime for which he was charged.  Finally, the District
Court correctly concluded that Young failed to carry his burden, through citation to any
record evidence, that the jury actually convicted him of a crime different from the one
charged, and the Special Verdict Form amply confirms that, notwithstanding the trial
court’s purported instructions on Count 5, the jury convicted on the offense charged.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
